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What then are the tenure standards for the affirmative action hires to
be? If they are the same tenure standards as for white males, then
probably a disproportionate number of blacks will not make tenure,
and this will be more than awkward. What is to be done? Are there to
be two tenure tracks? If so, will voting on tenure in the affirmative
action track be limited to blacks? I
There is room for suspicion that people are being excluded for discriminatory reasons (albeit probably unconscious ones), and also for the
hope . .. that a diversity of approaches . . . are desperately needed
antidotes to complacency and stagnation. There is some evidence that
feminism has had this effect ...

maybe minority scholarship will as

well.
I think not, myself. And one reason is that whereas feminism is
The problem

an approach (or cluster of approaches), race is not ....
...is that not all blacks are culturally black 2

Professor Kennedy does not mention a single idea that critical race
theory has produced .... I think Kennedy's faith that if only more
blacks were law professors they would produce a scholarship that
would "knock our socks off" is a false and sentimental faith, reflecting
a lack of realism that is a constant feature of Professor Kennedy's
work .... 3
*
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1. Richard A. Posner, Duncan Kennedy on Affirmative Action, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1157, 1159-60
(emphasis added).
2. Id. at 1160-61 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
3. Id. at 1161 (footnote omitted).
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INTRODUCTION

Because there are now some black law professors with tenure4 it has
become possible for black scholars to begin to have an intellectual conversation, to create a Black Legal Scholarship, that is not driven exclu-

sively by concerns of the white majority in American law schools.5 The
most powerful element of Black Legal Scholarship has been the ability of
these scholars to define their own agenda. This proactive component has
both positive and negative aspects. Taking control of our agenda provides black scholars with freedom and legitimacy on our terms. This

same autonomy simultaneously threatens others, especially some white
scholars. Because of the fears generated by Black Legal Scholarship,

some majority scholars attack it on the ground that it is not "real" scholarship because it does not speak for an appropriate constituency or deal
with appropriate concerns. The unstated but obvious premise is that
Black Legal Scholarship is mere special pleading.
The response by Judge Richard Posner to an article by Duncan

Kennedy 6 in a recent issue of the Duke Law Journal is perhaps the most
elegant example of this response. Judge Posner's response is the pious,

solipsistic demand of white authority and the right of ultimate control in
4. It is important to understand that tenure may mean less for black people than for white
people, particularly white males. For example, see the detenurization of Andrew Haines by William
Mitchell Law School after he filed a race discrimination suit. See School's Out, NAT'L LJ., June 12,
1989, at 6.
5. Several nonwhite scholars formed a group three summers ago to discuss the interplay of
race and law. Critical race theory developed out of the writings of these scholars and other nonwhite
scholars interested in similar issues. Critical race theory is not uni-perspectival; there is no single
consensus of a characterization of the theory. Certainly the name "critical race theory" suggests
some connection to critical legal theory, yet its name derives more directly from the name "critical
theory" by which some refer to the tenets of the Frankfurt School of Philosophy of Habermas and
Marcuse. The contributors to critical race theory have resisted defining themselves.
I have described similar movements as Black Jurisprudence and Black Legal Scholarship. See
generally Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarshi: Race and OriginalUnderstandings, 1991 DuKE L.J. 39. These movements include more scholars than does critical legal theory,
including some people who do not consider themselves part of the movements. Black Jurisprudence
consists of the significant early efforts made by black litigants and lawyers and the more recent
efforts of black judges. See id at 48-50. Black Legal Scholarship consists of the efforts centered on
changing the way we look at the law and empowering black teachers and students. I have focused
on the black part of the nonwhite mix for the purpose of self-definition. White Americans who
define nonwhite scholars as "other" negatively affect the notion of "people of color." By maintaining the distinctions between the various perspectives of people of color, I hope to encourage everyone
to deal with the differences and similarities between the histories of separate racial groups. However,
I recognize that all people of color writing on the interplay of race and law and similar issues are
joined by our opposition to racial oppression, and I believe that it is possible to build a progressive
response to this oppression.
6. See Duncan Kennedy, A CulturalPluralistCasefor Affirmative Action in Legal Academia,
1990 DuKE L.J. 705.
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the legal academy by one of this country's leading academicians and jufists. Judge Posner's Essay is important because, in both tone and substance, it manifests the arrogance and unselfcritical nature of white
supremacy in the legal academy. It is the majority voice, attempting to
silence black voices. Judge Posner's defense of neutral and objective
standards in legal scholarship fails to acknowledge that facially objective
and disinterested standards in fact serve the interests of the white majority in the legal academy.
I respond to emphasize that black scholars should reject the claims
obliquely made by Judge Posner about them and their scholarship and
that nonblack scholars ought to take care not to perpetuate similar efforts
at white authority in different contexts. This Comment will address
those aspects of Judge Posner's claims by discussing first how Judge Posner's assumption of white authority influences his interpretations of
scholarship, and then how Judge Posner attempts to use this white au-

thority to define who is black.7 I will then articulate what I am and am
not saying about the discourse between black and nonblack scholars. I

will end this Comment by demonstrating that simple defenses of Judge
Posner's position as neutral and nonracist will not work.

I.

WHITE AUTHORITY, RACE, AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

The critique of law by people of color is based not on color, but on
opposition to racial oppression. Judge Posner does not understand this.

Instead, he makes two conflicting and obfuscating claims about this
scholarship. First, he claims that using race to find candidates for faculty
appointments has led to a diminution in standards. This is an oblique

attack on the existence of black faculty in the academy. Judge Posner's
7. I cannot resist pointing out, however, the explicit racism in Judge Posner's first quote
above. His suggestion that there is a need for an affirmative action notion of tenure is supported
neither by the history of tenure by minority scholars at predominately white law schools, nor by the
history of tenure by white scholars at such schools. He does not provide support for his claims, and,
to my knowledge, there is none. Judge Posner assumes that the standards for white faculty are
uniform and uniformly applied. Maybe his experience at Chicago has jaded him. (Although how
Chicago could have had uniform standards with respect to blacks or any racial minority is hard to
fathom. There have been no minority scholars hired by Chicago, and few considered for tenure
during his time as a tenured member of that law faculty.) I suggest that in fact Professor Spann is
closer to the truth when he addresses similar claims made by Professors Kennedy and Carter:
Both articles offer elaborate arguments to support the proposition that, among legal academics, blacks are not as good as whites. As someone who teaches at a law school (Georgetown) where the median for black [professors] is higher than the median for whites,
both in terms of scholarly production and teaching ability, I am understandably skeptical.
Girardeau A. Spann, Reader's Comment, 1 RECONSTRUCTION, No. 2, 1990, at 3, 3 (alteration in

original).
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second claim is that the efforts of black and nonblack scholars who oppose racial oppression cannot be successful because race is unlike feminism. Of course race and feminism are different, but the point of both
forms of scholarship---Black Legal Scholarship and feminist legal theory-is an objection to the existing order. Judge Posner's effort to conflate claims of race and feminism does violence to the developing
scholarship of those attempting to create a scholarship opposed to the
traditional description of society, which is warped by racial and other

oppressions.
In discussing Black Legal Scholarship, it is important to point out
what we are not talking about: We are not talking about an entirely new
and alien form of scholarship. Much of Black Legal Scholarship is standard, "normal," and traditional in its structure, methods of analysis, and
even where it is published. Thus, my criticism of Judge Posner stems not
from the fact that I am doing calculus and he is doing linear algebra.8
Rather, my criticism is that Judge Posner wants to control the assumptions of the debate in either linear algebra or calculus. He demands the
right to control those assumptions without dealing with alternative assumptions proposed by black scholars. This demand to control the assumptions underlying the discourse is at the heart of the dispute between
Judge Posner and black legal scholars. White scholars often ask black

scholars to jump through some appropriate hoop before they will be listened to by "real" scholars. 9 If black scholars are doing some mode of
8. As a number of people have indicated, those scholars doing what others have called critical
race theory and what I have called a portion of Black Legal Scholarship have utilized a number of
techniques that are fairly new to the intellectual quivers of legal education. In particular, narrative,
autobiography, personal location, voice, and perspective have been used to make different points.
The angry objections of my colleagues in the academy to some of this work suggests how powerful
these techniques have been, but all of the techniques used by scholars of color have been adopted by
white scholars. For example, despite his opposition and criticism of some of the trends in critical
race theory, Paul Carrington's latest manuscript is, in fact, the senior white male equivalent of autobiography and narrative. See Paul D. Carrington, Legal Education in a Time of Moral Excess
(1990) (unpublished manuscript). For my criticism of this effort, see Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Letters
From Shoal Creek (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (arguing that Dean Carrington's
response is a poor history and a distortion of the true circumstances in American legal education).
9. This point is raised in an important essay by Henry Louis Gates. Professor Gates argues
that white critics often require of black scholars what Senator Calhoun required of black slaves:
For John C. Calhoun.. . , who stood firmly to his dying day a staunch advocate of states'
rights and as a symbol of an unreconstructed South-the person of African descent would
never be a full member of the human community, fit to be anything but a slave, until one
individual black person-just one-demonstrated mastery of the subtleties of Greek syntax, of all things! Perhaps fearing that this goal would be too easily achieved, Calhoun
later added mastery of the binomial theorem to his list of black herculean tasks.
Henry L. Gates, Authority, (White) Power, and the (Black) Critic: Or, It's All Greek to Me, in THE
FUTURE oF LrrERARY THEORY

324, 325-26 (Ralph Cohen ed., 1989). My use of the mathematical

example harkens back to Senator Calhoun's requirement that a black person have mastered the
binomial theorem. Judge Posner is requiring a similar kind of herculean task of black legal scholars,
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analysis in legal scholarship improperly, then Judge Posner should
demonstrate how.
Judge Posner does not defend the assumptions about racial difference implicit in his own intellectual discourse. For example, he does not
tell us why we ought to assume that the very highly qualified black
faculty we recruit to the legal academy are more likely to fail than are
whites. Behind that view is a set of assumptions that he and many white
scholars make, but he does not defend them in any serious way. 10 This
failure even to engage in discourse presumes that the assumptions that
black scholars add to legal scholarship are illegitimate without dealing
with them. This presumption is offensive to intellectual discourse. If
black scholars have added two to two and come up with five in legal
arithmetic, Judge Posner has the burden of demonstrating this mistake of
method.
Judge Posner's treatment of claims regarding Black Legal Scholarship is very different from his treatment of other assertions. In Judge
Posner's extensively researched discourse on jurisprudence, he engages
other intellectual enterprises much more divergent from his own than
but he is not candid enough even to enunciate it clearly. It is not sufficient for Judge Posner to say
that black scholars should publish about a particular set of issues; black scholars are writing about
almost every issue that white scholars are writing about. Nor is it sufficient to say that black scholars have not published in particular journals. See Paulette Caldwell & Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Scholarship and Pedagogy of Race: Theory, Method, and Practice (unpublished manuscript 1991).
Senator Calhoun's representative view of black people ("Show me one black to my liking and I
will overlook the others") seems to have been involved in President Bush's nomination of Clarence
Thomas to the Supreme Court. The President, like many white opponents of affirmative action,
evidently believes that if one black person supports his views on affirmative action that insulates him
from claims of racism.
10. Latino faculty have "qualifications" statistically similar to those of white faculty. See
Michael Olivas, Latino Faculty at the Border, CHANGE, May/June 1988, at 6, 7. Some will contend
that, although this may be generally true, it is not the case at places like Harvard, Yale, and other
elite institutions. The truth, however, is that nonwhite faculty at Harvard and Yale indeed have
qualifications that are very similar to those of the white faculty there. All of the black faculty at
Harvard and Yale have had distinguished careers as students and as law clerks to prestigious judges;
several have advanced degrees and other indicia of "quality." Indeed, many of the nonwhite faculty
at Harvard and Yale have distinguished themselves in scholarship not concerning race. See, e.g.,
Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759 (1990); CHRISTOPHER EDLEY,
JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL O BUREAUCRACY (1990); HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRANCONT AFFAIR (1990). Beyond a doubt, the faculties of the major elite schools have been enriched

by the nonwhite faculty they have hired.
This is not to say, however, that these schools have "done enough" or that there are, for example, no qualified women of color who could be added. Certainly these schools have also lost something when they have chosen not to hire some people of color. I believe, but cannot prove to
everyone's satisfaction, that the lost benefits to these schools from some of the appointments not
made with respect to people of color exceed the benefits foregone in other areas. This is certainly
true of my own school.
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Black Legal Scholarship.II His failure to address the assumptions of
Black Legal Scholarship is therefore special. It cannot be simply that no
black person has met Judge Posner's asserted neutral and objective standards of doing research. Rather, the problem has to be that, no matter
what black scholars do, he cannot hear their voices.12
It is also wrong to assert that black legal scholars simply attempt to
substitute their assumptions for those of the majority of the legal academy. The truth is that black scholars, in attempting to formulate alternative perspectives, are required to deal with the assumptions of the white
majority. As members of the legal academy, black scholars must start
where nonblack scholars start, but they also add perspectives and redefine the appropriate legal paradigms. Black Legal Scholarship is in this
sense a direct challenge to the often singular view of how questions may
be approached in law and other related scholarship.
Literary criticism has taught us not only the importance of and the
power of the writer, 13 but also the power of the readers and the interpretive community. 14 Judge Posner, however, does not consider black people significant either as readers or as members of the interpretive
communities. Power in the voice of the author is present in all writing:
11. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990).
12. His comment to which I respond bears this out. It was itself a response to Professor
Duncan Kennedy's article on affirmative action. See Kennedy, supra note 6. Interestingly, though,
the debate out of which Judge Posner's paper grew also included Professor Kendall Thomas of
Columbia Law School. Professor Thomas, a thoughtful and imaginative person, is black and difficult to ignore. One might think that Judge Posner would feel the need to note, if only in passing, the
thoughts of Professor Thomas; but Judge Posner is deaf to Professor Thomas's discussion of the very
issue of how Black Legal Scholarship ought to influence scholars. Judge Posner simply chooses not
to hear black voices. See Tape of Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Program of Law
and Interpretation, held at the AALS Convention (Jan. 1991) (on file with author).
I describe as the "Woody Allen Blues" the idea that race is so powerful that it is better left
undiscussed and unobserved. (Woody Allen makes movies without black people, not because he is
racist, but because he does not know how to deal with race.) Perhaps Judge Posner suffers from the
Woody Allen Blues. Perhaps his failure to discuss race stems from his fear that his discussion of it
would not be fair, but I do not hear that concern in this work. He has not been afraid to discuss
affirmative action in his scholarship. See, eg., Richard A. Posner, Democracy andDistrustRevisited,
77 VA. L. REv. 641 (1991); Posner, supra note 1. He addresses the issues of race and the law every
day as a federal judge. Thus, in this context, he does not have the luxury of being Woody Allen.
Unlike Woody Allen-writer, director, and actor-Judge Posner and Professor Posner has to deal
with important and immediate concerns of race in his work as a jurist and scholar.
13. See, eg., HENRY L. GATES, BEARING WITNESS: SELECTIONS FROM AFRICAN-AMERICAN
AUTOBIOGRAPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 3-9 (1992) (describing writers' ability to create

themselves);

JOANNE M. BRAXTON, BLACK WOMEN WRITING AUTOBIOGRAPHY: A TRADITION

WITHIN A TRADITION (1989) (stating that the genre of black women's autobiography reveals the
power of the autobiographical voice in the lives of black women).
14. See, eg., STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 171-73 (1980) (arguing that
meaning in texts comes from interpretive communities).
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The power of the author to control discourse is one of the most important aspects of writing. By commenting on the merits of black scholarship without engaging it, Judge Posner attempts to deny to black legal
scholars the power to speak or the right to author their own discourse.
These assertions of power over voice are central to the white control of
black concerns in the law and legal scholarship; this power to control
and silence is part of the system of racial oppression in America. It is
connected to the racial violence and to official attacks on black people by
police officers, judges, and officially sanctioned private individuals like
Bernard Goetz; only in the niceties of its expression is it separable from
the voice of the Klan and white supremacists. When Judge Posner uses
his white authority, he speaks not as a lonely white voice in the wilderness, but as the representative of white supremacy.
Judge Posner exercises this white authority in three ways: He
claims the right to define the story that is to be told; he dismisses without
any serious consideration the story of black scholars; and he supports his
view of this story with the semblance of fact backed by white power. In
each of these responses, he is confrontational without confronting black
people directly; he is dismissive without admitting the extent to which he
actually dismisses black concerns; and he is racist' s while claiming to be
a neutral observer of racial circumstances in the legal academy.
The heart of white authority in the legal academy is the demand of
its proponents to replace a black story told by black participants with a
story that excludes the voices and experience of black people. In his response to Duncan Kennedy, Judge Posner both tells a story about black
people devoid of black people's experience and tells a tale not to the
black legal scholars who are telling their own stories, but to a white supporter of some of the claims of black people. Judge Posner speaks manoa-mano to a fellow white elite law professor.

15. It is always dangerous to use the term "racist." I use it here with some care to talk about a
range of actions by white academicians who dismiss without engaging the voices of black academicians. Some will react to this charge by denying it with respect to Judge Posner and themselves. I
respond to this denial in Part IV. There is, however, another danger in raising the issue of racism: I
leave myself open to the accusation that what I really mean to do is to silence white concerns about
race. It may be, in fact, that some white scholars will be silenced by that fear. Certainly many white
academicians claim and worry about that silencing. I believe, however, that if we do not recognize
the racist nature of some of our reactions, then we are severely limited in our ability to find appropriate reforms. Besides, by not confronting the racism endemic to these circumstances, we risk silencing the voices of blacks and women in the academy. Because I believe that those black and female
voices have traditionally been the most likely to have been ignored and unheard, I am willing to risk
that some nonblack scholars will be discouraged by this response. I have no fear that all or even
most nonblack scholars will not speak on these general questions.
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At the beginning of his response, Judge Posner claims the right to
author the contours of the discourse about affirmative action: "Affirmative action-more bluntly, reverse discrimination-isa vast and variegated subject." 16 What does he mean by reverse discrimination? Does
he deal with this vast and variegated subject in all of its subtleties? The
answer is no. Instead, he tells a different story: He makes the central
issue of hiring black faculty whether it risks unfairnesses to white faculty.
This inquiry is very different than whether some black faculty ought to
be included in the pool of potential candidates. Judge Posner's story is
the story of black hiring from the perspective of the white majority.
Judge Posner's demand is to look at the hiring in American law schools
from the point of view of how much change white faculty will have to
endure. This is not the issue black scholars find important. They have
argued that, at least in some situations, it is necessary to look at this issue
from the perspective of black faculty. Judge Posner does not and cannot
admit that there is another perspective. If he did so, he would have to
give up his right to tell the story-to be the author of the discourse. The
best example of this change of focus is Judge Posner's question of
whether only black faculty ought to be qualified to judge the "affirmative
action" hires. 17 The reality of American legal education-where almost
all of the faculty are white males-makes this question idiotic. The truth
is that white control of who becomes a member of the legal academy is
for black faculty an uncomfortable reality. My experience and the experience of many black faculty is that there is little relaxation of that control by white faculty. Judge Posner mocks the modest intrusion on this
white authority by the very small number of black tenured faculty.
Just as Judge Posner tells the story of black hiring from the perspective of the white majority, he insists that black civil rights law is not the
product of the black lawyers and black clients who produced it. 18 Judge
Posner insists on including the white lawyers and judges as participants
in the creation of civil rights law, but he is not consistent in his view of
who counts. Just as black students and professors are seldom seen as
participants in the legal academy outside of civil rights law, black citizens who bear the costs of change do not matter to Judge Posner, as they
often do not matter to other federal judges. 19 Judge Posner cannot allow
16. Posner, supra note 1, at 1157 (emphasis added).
17. See id. at 1160.
18. See id. at 1161 ("[The notion that] modem civil rights law is the creation of black lawyers
(rather than of black lawyers plus white lawyers plus white judges plus white legislators)" is one of
Duncan Kennedy's "fantasies.").
19. See, eg., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (failing to consider the
interests of black teachers given superseniority to maintain racial balance in teaching ranks). For
further discussion, see Culp, supra note 5.
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black participants to control even civil rights law because it would mean
that he has lost his control. 20 Black (and increasingly nonblack scholars)
have the right to claim that civil rights law is a product of a historic and

difficult effort waged significantly by black lawyers, with only modest
contributions of white lawyers. This effort to change the way in which
law saw and treated black people could not ignore white people, but it

was about using black experience covertly to influence the law. 21 If
Judge Posner's assertion that civil rights law is controlled by the reactions of white judges and lawyers is the only way of examining the world,
then Judge Posner has really concluded that it is not possible for black

people to do anything uncontrolled by white interests.
To control the nature of the debate in legal scholarship, Judge Posner also uses the notion of status quo. He believes that the status quo is a

neutral beginning place from which to look at affirmative action. Every
change, every move made by anyone, starts from the view that the world

as it is isn't so bad. This starting point is easy for the majority to accept,
but for many who are not in the majority-particularly for those who are

seldom among the temporary majorities that get to decide 22-this is an
20. This effort at control also exists in some white authors very different from Judge Posner.
Mark Tushnet's book on the early history of the NAACP antisegregation strategy suffers from a
similar effort at belittlement of black participation and aggrandizement of white efforts. Tushnet
suggests that black lawyers were absolutely disorganized and controlled by their class and back-

grounds. See MARK V.

TUSHNET, THE NAACP LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDU-

CATION, 1925-1950, at 35 (1987) ("Thus, although [Charles] Houston was responsible for the
conduct of what at some points had been thought of as a systematic and coherently organized litigation campaign, he was more comfortable with pinpoint activities."). Professor Tushnet suffers from
the same disease of wanting to control the agenda, here the history, of black lawyers. Tushnet goes
on to criticize Justice Marshall as well, concluding that it was Marshall's commitment to competitive individualism that led to his decision to go for broke in the campaign for racial equality. However, as Marshall's career has shown, he was also always committed to a vision of community and
support that did not rest on that individualism. Tushnet attributes to Marshall a simple caricature
of reality to be able to make the larger claim about what could have been accomplished. It is not
that the efforts of Marshall and Houston should not be criticized, but that the criticism should
understand the power of change and revolution in its own terms that it represented.
This effort at control is part of a system of racial power, but even scholars of color are not
immune from such criticisms. Does Professor Delgado really pay attention to scholars of color in
his article about the imperial scholar? See Richard Delgado, The ImperialScholar: Reflections on a
Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 561 (1984). Indeed, I question whether I use
enough of the works of scholars of color myself. None of us is totally free of the remnants of racial
oppression.
21. See Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the
Me in Legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REv. 539, 544-52 (1991) (describing the "transformative power"
which results from considering personal experiences of blacks).
22. Leslie Friedman Goldstein describes this Madisonian view of the American political system
this way:
The [Madisonian] theory propound[s] at least three new techniques for checking or
preventing majority tyranny. First, the populace is purposefully diversified and dispersed
over a large and variegated territory, which fact makes less probable the formation of a
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insufficient beginning. Consider Judge Posner's discussion of the right of
black legal scholars to be members of the academy. 23 He implicitly assumes that the assumptions and initial distributions of resources that
brought the legal academy to where we are is sufficiently just to be assailable only by overwhelming contrary proof. Black people do not start
with this assumption; nothing in logic or legal analysis requires such a
beginning. Thus, the status quo is really white authority disguised as
neutrality. It is this view of white authority to which Judge Posner's
scholarship continually returns.
All authors exercise some power in their writing, but Judge Posner's
criticism has a discomforting point to it that goes beyond traditional discourse. He not only does not understand or use the stories told by black
scholars, but he dismisses their ability or their right to tell a story at all.
What are we to make of an article that dismisses the contribution of
black scholars to the legal academy but does not cite the works of black
legal scholars?24 Unlike the important contributions of feminism that
26
25
Judge Posner admits have influenced the law of rape, pornography,
and sexual harassment, 27 Judge Posner argues that Black Legal Scholarship has not contributed anything important to the legal academy and
probably will not.28 Also unlike feminism, where Judge Posner has taken
the opportunity to discuss and argue with feminists about what they
think, 29 he has never thought that anything said by a black scholar was
0
worthy of comment.3
stable majority coalition. Because the coalition is unstable from one issue to the next,
everyone is tomorrow's potential ally, and thus all should recognize that it is expedient and
prudent to avoid oppressing anyone or any group.
LESLIE F. GOLDSTEIN, IN DEFENSE OF THE TEXT: DEMOCRACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

157 (1991) (footnote omitted). African Americans often have not been able to become part of these
temporary coalitions either because of white solidarity and racial animus or because of legal restraints that limited the right of blacks to vote.
23. See Posner, supra note 1, at 1160-61.
24. The one black person cited by Judge Posner is Thomas Sowell. See Posner, supra note 1, at
1157 n.2.
25. See Richard A. Posner, Conservative Feminism, 1989 U. CHL LEGAL F. 191, 207.
26. See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 334-36 (1988).
27. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis ofSex DiscriminationLaws, 56 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1311, 1331-32 (1989).
28. See Posner, supra note 1, at 1160.
29. See Posner, supra note 25.
30. You may think I exaggerate this tendency in Judge Posner, but in his latest and quite
extensive work on jurisprudence, see POSNER, supra note 11, he discusses almost every trend in the
legal academy, but does not discuss the claims of black legal scholars in any serious way. He does
cite to an important effort on the part of minority scholars in theHarvardCivilRightsCivilLiberties
Law Review, see id. at 405, for the narrow proposition that marginal groups Will suffer unfairly if
some rights are removed; but that is the only citation to black or minority legal scholars in the book.
Almost every other important current (and a few not so current) strand in the legal community is
discussed. Why not Black Legal Scholarship or critical race theory? The reason is simple: For
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It is interesting that Judge Posner would take this view. Even with
respect to feminism, one of the most important trends in recent years is

the claim made particularly by black and other minority feminists that
they are "left out." The feminist community has responded by trying to
include the concerns of nonwhite women and other "marginal" women
inside their discourse. 3 1 Judge Posner, however, does not cite any of this
scholarship even when he comments on feminism in a conference volume
that includes the voice of at least one black woman. 32 Black women who
write as feminists in the legal academy are just as invisible to Judge Pos-

ner as are black legal scholars in general.
It is hard to believe the hubris in Judge Posner's ignoring of black
voices in legal scholarship. The footnotes in his books make clear that he
keeps up with the trends in legal scholarship. He could not have failed to
read Professors Derrick Bell, Charles Lawrence, Patricia Williams, Angela Harris, Kimberle Crenshaw, and Randall Kennedy. He must have
considered and dismissed the powerful call of Charles Lawrence for law

to take account of unconscious racism. 33 He could not have missed the
powerful epistles of Patricia Williams on race and contracts and race and
criminal law. 34 Even if he reads only the "best" law reviews, he could
Judge Richard Posner and much of the largely white male legal academy, the claims of black and
minority scholars about how race and the law intersect do not exist. Blacks and minority scholars
are not a part of the discourse. Judge Posner therefore does not have to say why the claims of black
scholars about race and law are not successful, because, again, he has not heard their voices. I do
not mean that he has not read what they write, but that he cannot process it into something that
makes sense in his epistemology. Racial differences matter only when they are so unimportant that
they will not influence anything that is important. See also Jerome M. Culp, Jr., The Educationof
Judge Posner?, TRANSrION, Iss. 52, 1991, at 114.
31. See, eg., Kimber6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U.
CH. LEGAL F. 139 ("I have chosen this title as a point of departure in my efforts to develop a Black
feminist criticism because it sets forth a problematic consequence of the tendency to treat race and
gender as mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis."); Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in FeministLegal Theory, 32 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); DEBORAH G. WHITE, AR'N'T I A
WOMAN? FEMALE SLAVES IN THE PLANTATION SOUTH 13-61 (1985); ELIZABETH SPELMAN,
INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988):

It is not news that dominant Western Feminist thought has taken the experiences of white
middle-class women to be representative of, indeed normative for, the experiences of all
women. Much of such thought, it is now common to say, expresses and reinforces the
privilege of white middle-class women: their lives and works, their griefs and joys constitute the norm in relation to which other women's lives-if they are mentioned at all-are
described as "different."
Id. at ix.
32. See Posner, supra note 25. This issue includes the article by Crenshaw, supra note 31.
33. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987). Judge Posner must also have missed or ignored the
growing list of scholars who have used Professor Lawrence's work in their own. See, e-g., Sheri L.
Johnson, UnconsciousRacism and the CriminalLaw, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016, 1031 (1988).
34. See PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
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not have missed Randall Kennedy's questioning of the celebration myth
in constitutional history scholarship.3 5 Indeed, we know that the
Harvard-educated Judge Posner must have read Professor Bell's chronicle when it was the Foreword to the HarvardLaw Review. 36 Judge Posner cannot plead ignorance.
Even the intellectually innocent cannot have missed the contributions of minority scholars, particularly black scholars, 37 to the debate
about the contours of hate speech. 38 Black scholars have not been alone
in trying to persuade the colleges to change what they do, but they, along
with feminists and other allies, have done to that area of the law what
feminists did to discussions of rape and sexual harassment: They have
begun to move the courts and scholars on this issue.3 9
This movement, however, has a larger history, one connected to the
way in which law has treated the voice of black people over time. Judge
Posner's way of dealing with black voices-ignoring them-is not new.
Before slavery was abolished in the United States, slaves made various
efforts to free themselves. In New York City, then one of America's largest arenas for black slavery, an alleged conspiracy took place that led to
the death of a number of white citizens. Because the allegations included
the actions of both white citizens and black slaves, the government provided trials. 4° In these trials, black defendants were not allowed to take
the oath and of course could not testify.4 1 The fate of these black slaves
was ultimately decided in silent ignorance of the black stories they possessed. Just as the colonial governments chose not to hear black slaves,
Judge Posner cannot hear black scholars. Their reasons are exactly the
same: Colonial American whites thought that black slaves lacked the
moral fiber to tell the truth and the mental ability to know what it was.
Similarly, white scholars like Judge Posner believe that black voices lack
35. See Randall Kennedy, Race RelationsLaw and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of
Professor Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1622 (1986).
36. See Derrick Bell, The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-Foreword: Civil Rights Chronicles, 99
HARV. L. REv. 4 (1985). A slightly expanded version of this essay appears in book form. See
DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987).

37. In another article, I address the larger question of the contributions of black legal scholars
to legal scholarship. See Culp, supra note 5 (arguing that black law professors are beginning to
develop a distinct racial perspective on the law, but that this perspective is limited by the ability of
white power brokers to hear it and the willingness of black scholars to be outside the mainstream).
38. See, eg., Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: RegulatingRacist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431.

39. See Frontiersof Legal Thought . The New FirstAmendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375-586.
40. Trials were not required for blacks, but were required for white conspirators. In 1741 in

New York, any judge or magistrate could decide the fate of any black slave before any five freehold-

ers. THOMAS J. DAVIS, A RUMOR OF REVOLT: THE GREAT NEGRO PLOT IN COLONIAL NEW
YORK 55 (1990).
41. Id. at 56.
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the moral (neutral and disinterested) perspective of white scholars on
black issues, and that black scholars in general are too vacuous to add
anything to the discourse. White scholars like Judge Posner would
rather speak to other white scholars about black legal scholars than
speak to black scholars themselves. Black issues that affect black citizens
are being decided without listening to the scholarly voices of black legal
scholars. It was not defensible in 1741 to fail to listen to the black stories
black people wanted to tell; it is no more defensible now.
To make the point even more clearly: Could Judge Posner discuss
feminism without discussing one woman author, or law-and-economics
without discussing the work of one person trained as an economist and
claiming to be doing such scholarship? He would be embarrassed to
produce such criticism. How can he not be embarrassed with respect to
black scholarship? The only answer is that Judge Posner believes that
black people cannot speak and defend themselves in a distinctive way.
Their voices are important only when they echo what white scholars
have said or will say. Black scholars cannot cede this authority to white
scholars without becoming a modem version of black slaves-silent, unheard, and powerless-in this modem discourse about race and the law.
II.

WHITE AUTHORITY AND THE BLACK QUESTION

Judge Posner tells us that all black people are not really black.
Some have become, to paraphrase Kenneth Stampp, white people with
black skins, nothing more and nothing less. 42 Judge Posner claims the
right to say that a black who is not "culturally black" cannot speak or
comment from a black experience because she does not share a unique
experience with other black people. 43 The problem is that Judge Posner
will not permit black scholars to define themselves. Judge Posner
reserves to himself the authority to define whose voice matters. Some
blacks scholars will deny either the possibility of speaking with a black
voice," or, while acknowledging that some black people can speak with
42. See KENNETH STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION (1954):
I have assumed that the slaves were merely ordinary human beings, that innately Negroes
are, after all, only white men with Black skins, nothing more, nothing less.*
*I did not, of course, assume that there have been, or are today, no cultural differences
between white and black Americans. Nor do I regard it as flattery to call Negroes white
men with black skins. It would serve my purpose as well to call Caucasians black men
with white skins.
Id at vii. In between the hardcover and the paperback editions of this book Professor Stampp added
the above footnote to respond to those who thought, even before "multicultural" and "politically
correct" were dominant terms, that his comment was insulting to black people.
43. Posner, supra note 1, at 1161.
44. See Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1745
(1989) (arguing that black and other minority scholars have not made a case for their exclusion from
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such a voice, will decline to claim such a voice.45 However, those choices
are made by those black scholars who use their own authority to define
themselves. Judge Posner claims the exclusive authority to decide what
is important in black voices and how it is to be used. He does not want
to permit a black person who has not suffered "enough" discrimination
or acquired "enough" black slang to bring her black experiences to the
legal academy. Judge Posner is therefore claiming the right to decide
what is important about black people. This strange claim of white au-

thority has a catch-22 quality. If black people decide that they are black,
then their views are too unimportant and divergent to be included; if they
decide to reject the exclusive black experience, then they offer nothing
that white scholars cannot bring to the discussion. It reminds me of the
headline from a recent New York Times: Poll Says Most Blacks Prefer
"'Black" to "African-American. ' 46 The question posed to black Americans was what would they like to be called. Authors of the question,
however, have to decide who is black: Who gets to answer the question?
A similar cultural agreement is at stake for black Americans in being
polled about their name and in deciding whether they will do Black
Legal Scholarship with a black voice. Leslie Espinoza reminds us that
naming is important and limiting to the opportunities of minority scholars.47 But demanding the right to name-to control the categories of
discourse-is what white authority is all about. Judge Posner is full of
this claim here.
The effort by Judge Posner to claim the right-the power-to decide

who is black is the ultimate use of the same white authority that is used
the academy or proven that they have a distinctive voice). But see Culp, supra note 5, at 90-91
(stating that Randall Kennedy is one of several black scholars who have begun to speak with a black
perspective); see also Robin D. Barnes, Race Consciousness: The Thematic Content of RacialDistinctiveness in CriticalRace Scholarship, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1864 (1990); Richard Delgado, Mindset
and Metaphor, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1872 (1990); Leslie G. Espinoza, Masks and Other Disguises:
Exposing Legal Academia, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1878 (1990).
45. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., RacialCritiquesofLegalAcademia: A Reply in FavorofContext,
43 STAN. L. REV.137, 137 (1990) (noting that he himself is a scholar of color who does not write
from a black perspective); see also Stephen L. Carter, Academic Tenure and "White Male" Standards: Some Lessons from the PatentLaw, 100 YALE L.J 2065 (1991):
I am troubled by the increasing number of academics who seem very serious about the idea
that knowledge of the author's race helps create a better context for understanding the
author's argument, not just on subjects relating to race, but on other subjects as well;...
[D]id I hide my true and best voice, the voice of color, under a patina of whiteness?
Id. at 2066. But see Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Voice, Perspective, Truth and Justice: Race and the
Mountain in the LegalAcademy (forthcoming Loyola Law Journal 1992) (stating that it is not possible for black scholars to be seen as being without their racial context).
46. PollSays Most Blacks Prefer "Black" to "African-American,"N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 29, 1991, at
A19.
47. See Leslie Espinoza, Labeling Scholarship: Recognition or Delegitimation, 5 ST.Louis U.
PUB. L. REv. 197 (1991).
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to limit the black voices heard in the legal academy. 48 I believe most
black scholars would reject the way that Judge Posner views blackness.

At least from my perspective as a black legal scholar, Randall Kennedy,
who may have had cultural experiences different than mine, is still black.

I am sure he is reminded of his blackness every day. I cannot escape
being a black law professor, whether or not I accept the limiting consequences of the way our society views blackness, and whether my parents
are upper-class doctors or coal miners. 49 This does not mean that black
scholars are indifferent to the views of the blacks who are chosen to rep-

resent black concerns, but this is no more true of black scholars than it is
true of law-and-economics scholars.
III.

YOU'RE Too SENSITIVE

Some will see this Comment as too sensitive to the casual comments

of a white scholar about affirmative action. Indeed, some will have noticed that in this response I have concentrated on the white/black controversy and will wonder whether I am being fair to this debate. Judge
Posner makes clear that he is concerned primarily with the issue of black

relations with the dominant white society.50 This view of affirmative action as a "black" concern is not new. It is clear that a majority of people
who think about affirmative action do so with a model of a black participant as the focus. This mythic story illuminates and obscures important
issues in this debate about race and the law. Most affirmative action
plans include not just black students, workers, or contractors, but also
members of other racial groups (and women) who have historically been
discriminated against.51 How is one to explain this inclusion of groups
who are not black if our model of racism and what needs to be remedied
is concentrated on blacks? If we focus instead on the participants who
48. I want to note that Judge Posner's suggestion that there are few people who could be law
professors requires questionable assumptions. The available evidence supports the view that there
are many more people out there than we are finding who could do what we do. Many successful
academicians were not at the top of their class, nor did they have any of the other indicia of success,
whereas a number of academicians who had all of the "right" criteria did not make it.
49. See Culp, supra note 21 (I and many other black law professors use our backgrounds to
educate our students.).
50. See Posner, supra note 1, at 1159. Judge Posner does not tell us exactly how he would
picture himself in this context, but he clearly identifies with the dominant majority culture. I will
call this dominant culture "white society" and will speak about the white/black conflict here, ignoring the multiconsciousness of Judge Posner because in this context he does not call on it.
51. The Supreme Court in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989), mocks
the Richmond City Council's efforts to include a wide array of groups in its set-aside program, and
in passing suggests that a black majority on the city council makes the use of race more suspect
because, unlike traditional situations, this group is helping itself. See id at 495-96. I should note in
passing that this makes two assumptions supported neither in the record nor in the recorded history
of racism in America. First is the claim that only blacks are helped by these programs. This is
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are women or Asians, it becomes harder for the people concerned about
affirmative action to assume the racial inferiority of the participants. By
saying that I do not mean either to participate in the denigration of black
participants in affirmative action or to suggest that our majority culture
does not hold strong and significantly debilitating views about women or
Asian men and women. However, at the heart of the concern with affirmative action as a black concern is almost always a belief in the intellectual and cultural inferiority of black people and an almost religious
zeal not to overcompensate the victims of racial oppression. Even when
the costs of affirmative action are spread very broadly, racism imbedded
in our society makes people react against its implementation. How else
can one explain statements by those who say they are opposed to "affirmative action plans" like Pell Grants and food stamps? 5 2 Of course, these
people confuse racially neutral class-based awards with affirmative action.5 3 These responses suggest that what is really at stake is not reform,
but rather any change in the racial status of black people.
Nor is the Supreme Court immune to these concerns. Justice
O'Connor's solicitude in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.5 4 for the
white contractors who do not have the right to have total control over
the contracts in Richmond is not matched by any real sensitivity to the
plight of the nonwhite contractors who have been perpetually locked out
by the system of racial control in our society. Indeed, the Croson Court
exhibited a form of myopia, seeing the world through the lens of the
majority and relegating the concerns of black contractors to the unimportant and unexamined fringe. This myopia is not new; it is reflected in
cases as diverse as Dred Scott v. Sandford 55 and Wygant v. Board of
Education 56
demonstrably untrue. Second, the court implicitly ignores the import of the inclusion of other people of color and women in the classification. You cannot criticize a "black" city council for racial
nepotism when they have included a majority of the people in the country in their program.
52. See, eg., Joseph Berger, Deep RacialDivisions Persistin New Generationat College, N.Y.
TIMES, May 22, 1989, at 1. My favorite example of campaign rhetoric is David Duke's statement in
his campaign for senator from Louisiana. Mr. Duke, a former head of one of the Ku Klux Klans,
founder of the National Association for the Advancement of White People, and a state representative, wondered wistfully when there would be a white Miss America again. Linda Witt, Political
Rockin" "n'Rollin',Gannett News Service, Nov. 7, 1990, available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, GNS
File. (Two of the last three Miss Americas have been African Americans, including one of my
former Duke Law students.) Many white Americans implicitly see law in the way David Duke sees
Miss America: something that belongs to white framers, white founders, and white intellectual concern. See Culp, supra note 5, at 77-80.
53. Pell Grants are need-based awards for post-high school education. The awards are not race

based.
54. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
55. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
56. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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The same is true even in the legal academy. When Mark Tushnet, a
critical legal scholar of the first rank, suggests in his retrospective on the
Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement that the academy has hired racial
minorities without appropriate politics instead of white males with appropriate politics, 57 I hear echoes of white supremacy masquerading as
radical politics.58 In contrast to Professor Tushnet's claim about the
57. See Mark Tushnet, CriticalLegal Studies: A PoliticalHistory, 100 YALE L.J. 1515 (1991):
The analysis... indicates that the following priorities will occur in hiring decisions: (1)
mainstream white males; (2) "mainstream" women and minorities (the scare quotes indicating that women and minorities are necessarily out of the mainstream in some respects
no matter what their scholarship or overt political affiliations); (3) women and minorities
who identify with the Left, including those who present themselves as affiliated with cls; (4)
white males who identify with the Left, including those who present themselves as affiliated
with cls. (Because the criteria by which conservatives are evaluated differ from the ones
discussed here, I cannot readily locate them on the scale just presented.) Thus, I do not
suggest that of those associated with cls only white males are underrecognized, but only
that structural reasons are likely to lead to a systematically greater amount of underrecognition of white males associated with cls.
Id. at 1541 n.100. This view of the state of hiring and tenure at universities and the problem of
diversity is shared by a wide variety of people, including the mainstream, who see themselves under
attack from the left and from women and people of color. Thomas Morgan noted:
Clinical law teachers... often see themselves as a distinct minority within legal education
and vigorously assert claims to better treatment. Legal writing teachers often express a
similar view, as do some legally-trained library staff members.
... Untenured faculty often see themselves as in a hostile worid, intimidated rather
than nurtured by senior colleagues. Faculty who teach interdisciplinary courses also find
themselves in a minority and complain of little understanding of the competing pulls of
their disciplines.
Thomas B. Morgan, President'sMessage: The Challenge to Maintain Diversity in Legal Education,
ASs'WAm. L. SCH. NEWSL., Nov. 1990, at 1, 1. The truth is more complicated, however, and,
despite some modest progress by women and to a lesser extent by people of color, Professor
Tushnet's view of the academy is not a reflection of the faculty meetings and tenure fights I have
observed at two law schools as a member of the faculty and a few others as a visitor.
58. These echoes grow stronger as Professor Tushnet's reflective paper on critical theory denigrates those of color who have made contributions and ridicules the methods they use, even as
Professor Tushnet uses them:
In light of the content of critical legal studies, I imagined as well that the form of the
presentation ought not be the standard expository essay. On reflection, however, I concluded that, though I had to avoid the expected content, I could not depart from the standard form.
Id. In a footnote, Professor Tushnet then explained his rationale underlying "could not":
"Could not," because of my concern that departures from the standard form require a
degree of technical competence in writing that I lack. I have been uncomfortable with the
publication of law review articles in the form of short stories, or short stories in the form of
law review articles, because they strike me as yet another manifestation of the "lawyer as
astrophysicist" mentality that I have criticized. See Mark V. Tushnet, Truth, Justice,and
the American Way: An Interpretationof Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX.
L. Rav. 1307, 1338 n.140 (1979). This was brought home to me in a conversation with a
former roommate, now a professor of literature, in which my wife and I were trying to
identify the author of a line of poetry quoted in a newspaper puzzle. My friend immediately began by saying something like, "Well, it couldn't be by X because the line is too long
for him." I realized then that there is a world of understanding about literature to which I
essentially have no access, and I now wonder about the degree to which other law professors do. The cynical version of this point is that if law professors could write short stories,
they would be short-story writers rather than law professors. On the other hand, my cynicism is tempered by my recollection of the short stories my father wrote. After he retired
from medical practice, he wrote what I think of as Jewish science fiction. He was not a
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hiring of blacks with "inappropriate politics," it is clear that many in the
academy would like to hire only black people who subscribe to the nar-

rowest spectrum of views on law, race, and change in the world and the
academy. Can these two views be reconciled? It seems to me only if we
understand that the chief beneficiaries of this perspective are those who

benefit from the white supremacy that both of these views represent.
This concern with white supremacy is centered on the black/white concern, even though it uses others to help define some aspects of its case.
Race used as a weapon may strike other racial groups, but in this instance it is directed not at Asians or Latinos or even white women, but at
black people.
Some are going to read this Comment as an effort to silence the

opposition.5 9 A friend who is a professor at another law school told me
that she once complained about the use of a gendered racial slur at a
faculty meeting discussion on racial harassment. (The slur was being
used as a hypothetical.) A colleague who had not been at that faculty
meeting later reported to her in a conspiratorial whisper that she understood that my black friend objected to the discussion of race in her pres-

ence. Nothing in this Comment should be read as an objection to
discussion. 60 To the contrary, the point of this Comment is to demand
answers and participation. This is the opposite of silencing, but it does

demand that white supremacy be addressed directly. This Comment
suggests that I have the power to control, even if in only in a small and
particularly elegant writer, but the novelty of the content was frequently enough to sustain
interest in his stories. So too, perhaps, with law review articles in the form of short stories.
The appearance of my former roommate and my father in this footnote is not adventitious.
Id at 1515 n.1. Throughout, Professor Tushnet has adopted the methods of narrative, although not
in a very effective way. He therefore excoriates these methods while using them. If anything, Professor Tushnet's article demonstrates that it is not possible to do astrology when all around you
people are doing astronomy. The astronomy influences even the skeptic. For a similar point about
Judge Posner, see Culp, supra note 30, at 117-18 (stating that Judge Posner's understanding that
legal analysis appropriately rests on "moves" rather than logic encouraged him to realize that
"1originalism

legalsignificaj8. 0 0 8 364 215.2 4m (on )TplTj11.2 0 8 344 268.2 45

slur 15ETBT3 Tr /F5 1 T6 7.8 0 0 8 49 2563632 (is )T60.3 Tr /F5 1 Tf 8.2 0 0 8 49 256.1 2m (opposPar8.5 0 0 8 170 36. T2m (opposj8.5 0 0 8 324 306.9T2m (the )Tj11.1 0 8 147 25776 2m (the )iatTjm8.2 0 0 8 166 25476 2m 6in )Tj11. 0 0 8 149 27566 2m 6in )TtTj8. 0 0 8 112 325.2 2m (objecssioed s7.5 0 0 8 302 326.9T2m 4is )Tj8.5 0 0 8 213 32619T2m (that)Tj8. 0 0 8 274 25279T2m (that)
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most traditional sense, the way in which white scholars respond to the
scholarship of black scholars.
IV.

POSNER'S NOT A RACIST: WHITE AUTHORITY MASQUERADING
AS NEUTRALITY

I am sure that some of Judge Posner's friends will contend that I
have unfairly pictured him as a racist. Judge Posner, they will say, may
be wrong or wrong-headed, but he is not a racist. He may be much too
concerned with how economic constraints limit the law, but he is not a
racist. These friends will point out that he has spoken out on the bench
against racism-sometimes in poignant ways. 6 1 These same friends will
no doubt point to the occasional kindness of Professor Posner to black
students or colleagues. I am sure some of Judge Posner's friends will be
black and will testify to Judge Posner's genuine friendship and
bonhommie.
I doubt none of these testimonials, and indeed I assume them in
advance to be a true and accurate picture of the "real" Judge Posner.
This Judge Posner is not the caricature who wants to sell babies, 62 but
the Judge Posner who genuinely cares about people, his wife, his children, and society. Judge Posner is a good person and has done many
good acts. To me, this "real" Judge Posner, however, is no different than
the white slaveowners in the antebellum South who were kind to their
slaves (some of the males genuinely loved and indirectly married black
female slaves) or the white southerner who is particularly kind to "Uncle
Joe" or "Aunt Susie," or the white northerner who patronizes her black
friends. These people are not intrinsically, eternally, or completely bad
people. They demonstrate real kindness to the black people with whom
61. See, eg., United States v. Town of Cicero, 786 F.2d 331, 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner,
J., concurring and dissenting):
The record compiled in the preliminary injunction hearing makes the strongest case for
violation of Title VII on a "disparate impact" theory that I have seen in my four years of
judging.... The black people whom these ordinances exclude from public employment in
Cicero cannot be identified, hence cannot be made whole by an award of damages.
But see Britton v. South Bend Community Sch. Corp., 775 F.2d 794 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.,
dissenting):
Although man does not live by bread alone, neither does he live by self-esteem alone, and it
is small comfort to a person who loses his job as a result of discrimination in favor of a
black to be told that he has, after all, the consolation of being white, that most of the people
who have discriminated against him are themselves white, and that he may get his job back
some day soon-though some of these plaintiffs have been waiting for three years. I am
willing to accept that the equal protection clause means as a practical matter less for whites
than for blacks but not that it means nothing at all, which if this decision stands will be the
approximate situation in this circuit after today.
Id. at 821.
62. Richard A. Posner, Adoption and Market Theory: The Regulation of the Market in Adop-

tions, 67 B.U. L. REv. 59, 59 n.1 (1987).
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they interact, but they also demand the right to decide when a black
person is "out of place." In the antebellum South, black slaves could
enjoy real kindness, but a mistake of form could lead to harsh punishment-even death. Similarly, in this society, within my lifetime and still
too often today, black persons who violate the codes of propriety find
themselves subject to punishment, both official and unofficial. Judge Posner's kindnesses are no different. He demands the authority to decide, to
be the white power in the legal academy. It is this demand, this assertion
of pure white supremacy, that black scholars must reject in the claims of
their colleagues.

